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Abstract
Delayed perfect monitoring in an innitely repeated discounted game is studied. A
player perfectly observes any other players action choice with a xed, but nite
delay. The observational delays between di¤erent pairs of players are heterogeneous
and asymmetric. The Folk Theorem extends to this setup, although for a range
of discount factors strictly below 1, the set of belief-free equilibria is reduced un-
der certain conditions. This model applies to any situation in which there is a
heterogeneous delay between information generation and the playersreaction to it.
JEL classication numbers: C72, C73
Keywords: Repeated Game, Delayed Perfect Monitoring, Folk Theorem
1 Introduction
Innitely repeated discounted games capture dynamic strategic interaction between im-
patient economic agents. Additional equilibria arise compared to one-shot games and
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the associated payo¤ vectors can be Pareto superior to those achieved in any stage game
equilibrium. The well-known Folk Theorem states this result. For innitely repeated
discounted games, it is obtained by Fudenberg, Levine and Takahashi (2007), thereafter
FLT. Frequently, a player is assumed to observe his opponentsbehavior immediately and
perfectly, referred to as perfect monitoring. This assumption is relaxed in the imperfect
monitoring literature, in which each player receives an imperfect private or public signal
of every action prole played.1
In this paper, monitoring is delayed since each player obtains a private signal about the
action chosen by another player with a xed, but nite delay. These signals are perfect,
and thus, a repeated game with delayed perfect monitoring is studied. Formally, for each
pair of players that participate in an innitely repeated discounted game there exists a
delay with which they observe each others action choice this delay might be asymmetric
and is allowed to be heterogeneous for di¤erent pairs of players. In each period, a player
observes the actions chosen by a subset of players, including himself, at di¤erent points
of time in the past. The players take decisions under imperfect information in any but
the rst period. However, since players do not take into account beliefs about unobserved
action choices in the past the concept of belief-free equilibrium, a sequential equilibrium
with a simple belief system, is used.
The Folk Theorem extends to the delayed perfect monitoring model, that is, any feasi-
ble and strictly individually rational payo¤vector is supported by a belief-free equilibrium
strategy prole when the players are su¢ ciently patient. Then, they do not mind to re-
ceive the repeated games history of action proles gradually over time. However, for
a range of discount factors strictly below 1, the delay in obtaining information, under
certain conditions, triggers a players deviation from some previously agreed sequence of
play. In this setup, for impatient players, the set of belief-free equilibria is reduced in
comparison to the perfect monitoring case under certain conditions.
The related literature considers di¤erent setups. In one, all players play the same
repeated game and a player observes an imperfect private or public signal of each action
prole (see footnote 1). Other models of imperfect monitoring are surveyed in Mailath
and Samuelson (2006).
The next section introduces notation and denitions. In section 3, the model is illus-
trated for the Prisoners Dilemma. In section 4, information spreading and punishment
reward are dened. Both are prerequisites for the Folk Theorem, which is stated in section
5, along with conditions under which impatient players deviate from a given sequence of
1Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994), for example, obtain a Folk Theorem under imperfect public
monitoring, and Kandori (2002) surveys the imperfect private monitoring literature.
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action proles. Moreover, a comparative static result is provided. The model is presented
in unobservable mixed actions. Before concluding, possible extensions are discussed.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Stage Game and Observation Structure
Each player i in the nite set of players I = f1; :::; ng has a nite set of pure actions
Ai: Pure action ai is an element of this set. The stage games pure action space is
A = i2IAi; with generic element a; called pure action prole. To emphasize player is
role, it is written as (ai; a i): For any subset of players S  I; let AS = i2SAi; and
denote by aS an element of this set. Player is payo¤ function is a mapping hi : A ! R;
and the payo¤ function h : A ! Rn assigns a payo¤ vector to each pure action prole.
The stage game in normal form is then the tuple G  (I; (Ai)i2I ; (hi)i2I): Dene the
convex hull of the nite set of payo¤ vectors corresponding to pure action proles in G
as co(G) = cofx 2 Rn j 9 a 2 A : h(a) = xg: Dene the mixed extension of G by
G  (I; (i)i2I ; (Hi)i2I); where i = fi : Ai ! [0; 1] j
P
ai2Ai i(ai) = 1g is player is
mixed action space and Hi :  ! R his payo¤ function for  = i2Ii: Let  2  be a
mixed action prole. To emphasize player is role, it is written as (i;  i): The function
H :  ! Rn assigns a payo¤ vector to each mixed action prole. Note that a mixed
action consists of a players randomization experiment and the pure action he chooses. It
is assumed that the randomization experiment is not observable, but only the pure action
chosen. This is referred to as unobservable mixed actions.
Denote the delay with which player i observes player js action choice by dij: It is
a nite positive integer for all i; j 2 I: The maximal delay between player i and any
other player is dened by di = maxj2I dij; and the maximal delay between any pair of
players is dened as d = maxi2I di: For each player i; partition the set of players with
respect to the delay with which i observes their action choices: all players he immediately
observes including himself are in i(1) = fj 2 I j dij = 1g; and for any 2  m  di; dene
i(m) = fj 2 I j dij = mg: Each of these sets might be empty, except of i(di); by denition,
and of i(1) since it contains at least i: Denote this observation structure by OS: It can
be represented in an n  n matrix: the ijth entry species the delay with which player
i observes player js action choice. This matrix need not be symmetric, that is, for any
i 6= j; dij need not coincide with dji:
When the stage game is played repeatedly, in each period, a player rst chooses an
action, in a way specied below, and then makes observations. Since di is player is
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maximal delay, with a lag of di   1 periods, he observes the repeated games entire
history.2 Additionally, a player has perfect recall. Hence, for any player i 2 I at any time
period t  1; there is a set of observations, denoted by Obti; that includes all histories of
observations that i may have made at the end of period t: It is dened recursively as
Ob1i = Ai(1);
Ob2i = A
2
i(1)  Ai(2);
...
...
...
Obti = A
t
i(1)  At 1i(2)      At di+1i(di)
for all t  di; where for any 1  m  di and any t  1; Ati(m) = (j2i(m)Aj)t: Note
that Ati(m) = ; if, and only if, i(m) = ;; and that, by denition, only pure actions are
observable.
Player is observation at t is denoted by obti 2 Obti: Given G; a sequence of mixed
action proles ftg1t=1; where t 2  for all t  1; generates a sequence of observations
for player i;
ob1i = (a
1
i ; a
1
i(1));
ob2i = (a
1
i ; a
1
i(1); a
1
i(2); a
2
i ; a
2
i(1));
...
...
...
obti = (fasigts=1; fasi(1)gts=1; fasi(2)gt 1s=1; :::; fasi(di)gt di+1s=1 )
for all t  di: At any t < di; player i did not yet observe the behavior of at least one
other player in period 1. At t = di; ob
di
i contains the actions chosen by all players at
t = 1:3 Abusing notation, this is referred to as a1 2 obdii (since a1 belongs to A): At
any t > di; action proles a1; :::; at di+1 are identied by player i; and hence, in an abuse
of terminology, said to be elements of obti: Thus, at any t  1; the sequence of mixed
action proles generates an observation prole obt 2 Obt; where Obt = i2IObti: Given an
observation structure OS; the players play an innitely repeated discounted game.
2.2 Repeated Game with Delayed Perfect Monitoring
In the innitely repeated discounted game with delayed perfect monitoring, at each point
in discrete time, t = 1; 2; :::; stage game G is played.
2At the end of any t  di; player i knows the actions played at t by all players in i(1); those played by
all players in i(1) and i(2) at t  1; :::; and nally the ones played by all players at t  di + 1 and before.
3This setup is equivalent to the following: each mixed action prole t generates a public signal with
a delay of d  1 periods and certain private signals in all periods s; where t  s < t+ d  1:
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Let player is set of behavior strategies be Fi = fff ti g1t=1 j f 1i 2 i; and for all t > 1;
f ti : Ob
t 1
i ! ig: At any t  1; player is behavior strategy fi = ff ti g1t=1 prescribes him
to choose a mixed action. For t > 1; it maps his set of observations to his mixed action
set. Let F = i2IFi be the behavior strategy space of the repeated game with delayed
perfect monitoring and let behavior strategy prole f = (f1; :::; fn) be an element of F:
To emphasize player is role, it is written as (fi; f i): At any t  1; each f 2 F recursively
generates an action prole t(f) = (t1(f); :::; 
t
n(f)) and a corresponding observation
prole obt(f) = (obt1(f); :::; ob
t
n(f)):
4 Each f 2 F thus generates a sequence of action
proles ft(f)g1t=1 and a sequence of observation proles fobt(f)g1t=1:
Given a common discount factor  2 [0; 1);5 the function H : F ! Rn assigns a payo¤
vector to each behavior strategy prole. Given f 2 F; player is payo¤, Hi (f) = (1  
)
P1
t=1 
t 1Hi(t(f)); is the (1 )-normalized discounted sum of stage game payo¤s. The
repeated game with delayed perfect monitoring associated with stage game G; discount
factor  and observation structure OS is then dened as the normal form game GOS; 
(I; (Fi)i2I ; (Hi )i2I); where the star superscript is suppressed.
If i(1) = I for all i 2 I; then GOS; is identical to the innitely repeated discounted
game, referred to as G: In this case fi simplies: at any t > 1 it maps At 1 = (i2IAi)t 1
to i; that is, each player conditions his action choice on the history of observable action
proles chosen by all players between periods 1 and t  1:
Finally, the players commonly know the game played, the observation structure and
the strategy choices available to all players, and are assumed to observe their payo¤ with
a delay of d periods.6
2.3 Payo¤ vectors generated by Belief-free Equilibria
A players individually rational payo¤ is the lowest to which he can be forced in a stage
game. It obtains when he maximizes his payo¤ while all other players minimize it and is
called minmax payo¤. For any i 2 I; dene his minmax payo¤ in mixed actions by
i  min
 i2 i
max
ai2Ai
Hi(ai;  i): (1)
4For any player i; let 1i (f) = f
1
i and ob
1
i (f) = (a
1
i (f); a
1
i(1)(f)); and for t > 1; given ob
t 1
i (f) 2 Obt 1i ;
ti(f) = f
t
i (ob
t 1
i (f)) and ob
t
i(f) is dened accordingly. If the prescribed mixed action at t is degenerate,
player i is asked to choose a pure action and this, abusing notation, is referred to as ati(f) = f
t
i (ob
t 1
i (f)):
5It may be interpreted as the probability with which the game is played again in the next period. The
probability that the repeated game ended by period T then converges to 1 as T goes to innity.
6After di   1 periods, player i observed the action proles played between periods 1 and t   di + 1;
and can calculate or equivalently observe his payo¤ for all these periods; and d = maxi2I di:
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The minmax payo¤ is a players individually rational payo¤ in any repeated game, in
which the dimension of the payo¤ space is equal to the number of players.7 Denote the
vector of minmax payo¤s in mixed actions by ; and the mixed action prole forcing
player i to his minmax payo¤ by i: It is one solution to the optimization problem on
the right-hand-side of (1), on which the players agreed. Without loss of generality any
players minmax payo¤ is normalized to 0, that is, for all i 2 I; Hi(i)  0:
The set of feasible payo¤ vectors of the repeated game with delayed perfect monitoring
is dened as8
F = fx 2 Rn j 9 fatg1t=1 : 8 t  1; at 2 A; and 8 i 2 I; xi = (1  )
1P
t=1
t 1hi(at)g:
Any feasible payo¤ vector is achievable by a sequence of pure action proles. Mixed
actions need not be used, apart from the minmax punishment of a deviator.
The set of feasible and strictly individually rational payo¤ vectors is denoted by F:
It contains all feasible payo¤ vectors that are larger than  = (0; :::; 0) and is dened as
F = fx 2 F j x > g:
Any payo¤ vector in this set is a candidate to be supported by a belief-free equilibrium.
In a belief-free equilibrium, each player conditions his action choices only on his ob-
servations and a strategy prole is sequentially rational for any consistent belief a player
may have about the yet unobserved actions chosen by all other players (in the most recent
periods).9 Hence, beliefs are not modelled formally.
Denition 1. A behavior strategy prole f  2 F is a belief-free equilibrium (BFE) of
GOS;; if for all t  1 and given any obt 2 Obt; ff  (ob 1)g1=t+1 is such that for all i 2 I
and all fi 2 Fi;
(1  )
1P
s=t+1
s 1Hi(s(f ))  (1  )
1P
s=t+1
s 1Hi(s(fi; f i)):
When i(1) = I for all i; then this denition includes G and the concepts of belief-free
and subgame-perfect equilibrium coincide. However, equilibria of GOS; and G are called
belief-free when Denition 1 is satised, and the corresponding sets of BFE strategy
7The repeated game with delayed perfect monitoring extends to stage games with less than full-
dimensional payo¤ space as is remarked in the conclusion.
8Any payo¤ vector in co(G) is feasible for  2 (1  1z ; 1); where z is the number of vertices of co(G): For
any discount factor in this range, sets F and co(G) coincide; see Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994).
9A players belief for all observed action choices is uniquely determined. His strategy is only condi-
tioned on observed actions, while his belief about unobserved actions is irrelevant for his choices.
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proles are denoted by BFE(GOS;) and BFE(G); respectively. A behavior strategy
prole is a BFE if, and only if, no players nite unilateral deviation is protable at any
point in time.10
3 The Observation Structure makes a di¤erence
The following example illustrates how imposing an observation structure on a repeated
game a¤ects its set of BFE: Let G^ = (I; A; h) be a generalized Prisoners Dilemma game,
where n > 2: At each point in time, a player chooses either C (cooperate) or D (defect).
The payo¤ function of any player i 2 I is dened as follows: for each a 2 A;
hi(a) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
3 if aj = C; 8 j 2 I
0 if ai = C and 9 j 2 I n fig s.t. aj = D
4 if ai = D and aj = C; 8 j 2 I n fig
2 if ai = D; 9 j 2 I n fig s.t. aj = D and 9 l 2 I n fi; jg s.t. al = C
1 if aj = D; 8 j 2 I:
In the unique Nash Equilibrium of stage game G^ all players choose D; since it is
a strictly dominant action. In the repeated Prisoners Dilemma, strategy proles that
yield all players a higher payo¤ are sustained as BFE under certain conditions, such as
the trigger strategy prole. It prescribes each player to cooperate as long as all players
cooperate and to defect forever if any player defected. Player is trigger strategy, denoted
by f^i 2 Fi; is dened as follows: f^ 1i = C; and for t  1; given obti 2 Obti;
f^ t+1i (ob
t
i) =
(
D if 9 1    t such that for a 2 obti; aj = D; while a j = C
C otherwise.
Given f^ 2 F; observe that for all i 2 I and all t  1; rst ati(f^) = C; and second,
obti(f^) is such that for all a

j 2 obti(f^); aj = C as well for all 1    t and all j 2 I:
Hence, for all i 2 I; Hi (f^) = (1  )
P1
t=1 
t 13 = 3:
3.1 A one-period delay between two players
Consider a generalized Prisoners Dilemma game with n = 3; as represented in Figure 1,
where player 1 chooses rows, player 2 columns and player 3 matrices. Let the following
10Since  < 1; a players gain from an innite deviation can be approximated by that of a nite one.
Thus, unilateral deviations of nite length from a behavior strategy prole are not protable if, and only
if, it is a BFE of the repeated game with delayed perfect monitoring; see Mailath and Samuelson (2006).
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3C D
1-2 C D
C 3, 3, 3 0, 4, 0
D 4, 0, 0 2, 2, 0
1-2 C D
C 0, 0, 4 0, 2, 2
D 2, 0, 2 1, 1, 1
Figure 1: Prisoners Dilemma for three players
symmetric observation structure OS be given: player 2 observes players 1 and 3, and both
of them player 2 perfectly. However, players 1 and 3 observe each others action choice
with a delay of one period. The trigger strategy prole is a BFE of G^OS; if, and only
if, all players are patient enough, that is,  is higher than some threshold value. Then,
none of them ever deviates. Corresponding conditions on  must hold for the truncation
of the repeated Prisoners Dilemma with delayed perfect monitoring at any point in time,
that is, given any observation prole. A BFE does not impose restrictions on play after
a multilateral deviation by two or more players. Any unilateral deviation that may arise
can be uniquely allocated to one of the following three classes:
1) initial unilateral deviations,
2) subsequent unilateral deviations (before the initial is known by all players), and
3) unilateral deviations while the punishment takes place.
Obviously, unilateral deviations during the punishment are not protable since all
players choose D: This action prole is the stage game Nash Equilibrium in strictly domi-
nant actions. Hence, every player best-replies independently of : For the same reason, no
player can deviate protably from the trigger strategy prole in class 2. After a players
initial deviation, he and any player who knows about it are best-o¤ to play D forever
(rather than to deviate and to choose C at any point in time).
It remains to show that no player can protably deviate from the trigger strategy
prole when all players should play C: Given ; player 2 (who is perfectly observed by 1
and 3) does not deviate in any period  if, and only if,
(1  )
1P
t=1
3t 1  (1  )
 1P
t=1
3t 1 + 4(1  ) 1 + (1  )
1P
t=+1
1t 1;
(1  )
1P
t=+1
2t 1  (1  ) 1;
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2+1  (1  ) ;
  1
3
:
The value of 1
3
is not only the threshold value for player 2 in this example but also
that for all players in a repeated Prisoners Dilemma with perfect monitoring. The obser-
vation structure a¤ects, however, the threshold value of the remaining two players in this
example. Given ; player 1 (and similarly 3) does not deviate from the trigger strategy
prole in any period  if, and only if,
(1  )
1P
t=1
3t 1  (1  )
 1P
t=1
3t 1 + 4(1  ) 1 + 2(1  ) + (1  )
1P
t=+2
1t 1;
(1  ) + (1  )
1P
t=+2
2t 1  (1  ) 1;
which can be simplied to 2 + 2   1  0: The only positive solution to this quadratic
equation is   0:414: Hence, in class 1 of the BFE conditions the requirement on ; or
the playerspatience, is higher in this example than in a perfect monitoring model, due
to the one period lag with which players 1 and 3 observe each others action choice.
This example extends to any set of players where n > 3 as long as every player is
observed by at least one other player immediately.
3.2 The Prisoners Dilemma with any Observation Structure
A similar result holds for any observation structure in the repeated Prisoners Dilemma
in which all players follow the trigger strategy and every player is observed by at least one
other player immediately. In the above example it takes 2 periods until full punishment
sets in. Given any observation structure, it takes di periods until all other players punish
player i: Until then the deviators payo¤ is 2 since at least one player still chooses C:
Thereafter, it is 1 forever.
Since d is the maximal delay between any pair of players, there is a discount factor 
that solves 2+d 1  0 such that no player deviates from the trigger strategy prole.
Hence, for this strategy prole all repeated Prisoners Dilemma games can be classied
according to their observation structure. The threshold value of the discount factor ;
for which no player deviates from the trigger strategy prole, that is, the level of patience
required to sustain cooperation is non-decreasing in d; since a higher delay implies that
at least one pair of players observes each other after a larger time lag.
9
Although the expression 2 + d   1  0 depends on d; even for very large values
of d the threshold value for  is bounded above by 1
2
: To see this, take the limit of the
inequality when d converges to innity. Since  < 1; the term d converges to 0 and the
inequality simplies to 2 1  0 or   1
2
: Hence, for "moderately patient" players, the
trigger strategy prole is a BFE in any repeated Prisoners Dilemma with delayed perfect
monitoring as long as every player is observed by at least one other player immediately.
The observation structure may thus reduce the set of discount factors for which a
strategy prole is a BFE: Moreover, for a given discount factor, the set of BFE strategy
proles and the corresponding set of payo¤vectors may be strictly smaller in the repeated
game with delayed perfect monitoring than in the version with perfect monitoring.11
4 Information Spreading and Punishment Reward
The general conditions for a BFE are not as simple as in the previous section since the
minmax action prole in most stage games is no Nash Equilibrium in strictly dominant
and pure actions. Hence, punishment is asymmetric and costly at least for some players.
The part of the Folk Theorem behavior strategy prole after a deviation is outlined next.
Until all players know about a deviation, they follow the originally prescribed sequence
of action proles. While in the Prisoners Dilemma for the trigger strategy prole all
players punish player i from di periods after his deviation on, in general, all players start
to punish simultaneously any unilateral deviator after d periods. Only then the deviation
is commonly known. The phase during which the information about a deviation spreads
throughout the set of players is called Information Spreading Process (ISP ): Note that
the ISP -payo¤ is not normalized by (1  ):
Denition 2. Given f 2 F; the Information Spreading Process payo¤ of player i following
an initial deviation in period t0 only is dened as
ISP t
0
i = Hi(
t0+1(f)) + ::: + d 2Hi(t
0+d 1(f)):
The ISP extends easily to any players deviation of nite length. Any subsequent
deviator starts a new ISP which may overlap with the ongoing one. Once every player
identied the last deviator, he is forced to his minmax payo¤ at least until his entire
gain from deviating is taken away or another subsequent deviator is punished. During
11The reduction in the equilibrium payo¤ space for  2 [ 13 ; 12 ); for example, is the point (3; 3; 3); since
the trigger strategy prole is no BFE if at least one pair of players obtains information about each other
with a delay, and no other BFE strategy prole supports this payo¤ vector.
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punishment some players incur a loss in their payo¤. Hence, punishment starts once
all players know about the deviation and is restricted to a minimal amount of time.
Thereafter, a punishment reward phase is played in order to induce the punishers to
randomize over the pure actions in the support of the mixed minmax action and to
reward them for their temporary payo¤ loss, obviously, without beneting the deviator.
Given any feasible and strictly individually rational target payo¤ vector x 2 F;
there are player-specic punishment reward payo¤ vectors denoted by !1; :::; !n: They
are achieved by sequences of pure action proles and have the following properties. For
any player i; xi > !ii > 0; and for two distinct players i 6= j; !ii < !ji ; that is, the i-th
component of vector i is strictly smaller than that of any other one. In this way the
punishers are rewarded but not the punished player i:
In order to induce the players to randomize in their punishment against some deviator
i; who deviated at t0; the sequence of pure action proles that yields !i depends on the
realized action proles during punishment. Formally, dene by
dif i ;t
0
j  (1  )[
t0+d+ TP
t=t0+d
t t
0 d(hj(at) Hj(i))]
the di¤erence between any player js realized payo¤during the punishment against player
i and his expected payo¤ given the mixed action prole i that yields i; where T is the
endogenously determined last time period of is punishment which is a positive integer.
At period T + 1 player is punishment reward phase starts. Denote the sequence of pure
action proles that is played during this phase by fcsg1s=1: It is determined together with
a positive integer ~T such that for every player j 2 I;
!ij = (1  )[
~TP
t= T+1
t 1hj(~ct) +
1P
t= ~T+1
t 1hj(ct)] + dif
i ;t 0
j :
Intuitively, d periods after the end of player is minmax punishment, the realizations
of all mixed actions chosen by the players during punishment are commonly known. The
action proles played during the periods after is punishment are made conditional on
these realizations such that each player j receives exactly !ij in the punishment reward
phase. Hence, a player whose randomization made him obtain a lower payo¤ during the
punishment phase than his expected payo¤ from action prole i receives a compensation
while a player whose payo¤ during this phase is larger than the expected one from i
receives a penalty. The existence of this conditional punishment reward phase for high
discount factors and given any x 2 F follows, for example, from FLT. They show that
this compensation phase ends in nite time. Its last time period is denoted by ~T : From
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~T +1 on, the sequence of action proles played depends only on the name of the deviator,
but not on his punishment phase. Together with the one played from T + 1 until ~T this
yields fcsg1s=1: In this way, all players are made indi¤erent between randomizing over the
pure actions in the support of the mixed minmax action since their payo¤ is the same
independently of the realized action, and they actually randomize, although deviations
within the support of the mixed minmax action would not be observable.
5 The Results
A behavior strategy prole can be constructed for which, given any observation prole, no
players unilateral deviation is protable, provided that the players are patient enough.
It is a BFE of the repeated game with delayed perfect monitoring and a Folk Theorem
obtains. The proof of the Folk Theorem is relegated to Appendix A. Its basic idea is in
line with Abreu, Dutta and Smith (1994).
Theorem 1. Let G and OS be given. Then, for all x 2 F; there is ~ < 1 such that for
each  2 (~; 1); there is a corresponding ~f 2 F such that ~f 2 BFE(GOS;) and H( ~f) = x:
Various sequences of pure action proles yield the same payo¤vector x 2 F: Behavior
strategy prole ~f gives the structure to support any of them. It prescribes the players to
follow a given sequence of pure action proles and to punish any unilateral deviator from
d periods after his deviation on until his entire gain is taken away or some other player
is punished. Thereafter, his punishment reward phase is played. Mixed actions are only
used for punishment. Each observation prole that may arise belongs to one of a small
number of classes of observation proles. For each it is shown that no player can deviate
protably. The objective of the Folk Theorem is not to nd the most e¢ cient strategy
prole and it obtains as well for other possibly more e¢ cient strategy proles.
Patient enough players do not mind to receive the repeated games history gradually
over time. That punishment is not immediate but sets in after a nite delay is strong
enough a threat for them. In the limit, the e¤ects of the delay in observations disappear
and the same set of payo¤ vectors is generated by BFE in the repeated game and in its
version with delayed perfect monitoring.
Corollary 1. Let G and OS be given. Then, there is  < 1 such that for all  2 (; 1)
and all x 2 F; there are f 2 BFE(GOS;) and f 2 BFE(G) such that fat(f)g1t=1 
fat( f)g1t=1; and H(f) = H( f) = x:
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For impatient players, or in other words, for a range of discount factors strictly below 1,
the delay in observation makes a di¤erence, as already shown for the Prisoners Dilemma
in section 3. A similar result can be derived for any stage game.
A lower bound of the discount factor  is identied such that for all  2 [0; ]; only
sequences of action proles that prescribe the innite repetition of stage game Nash
Equilibria are supported byBFE in both games. Together with Corollary 1, the reduction
in the set of sequences of action proles that are supported by BFE in a repeated game
with perfect monitoring but not with delayed perfect monitoring is then stated formally.
Corollary 2. Let G and OS be given. Then, there are 0 <    < 1 such that for all
 2 (; ]; ffat(f)g1t=1 j f 2 BFE(GOS;)g  ffat( f)g1t=1 j f 2 BFE(G)g:
For a range of intermediate discount factors, the observation structure reduces the set
of sequences of action proles that are generated by BFE strategy proles. In special
cases, the lower and upper bound of  coincide and the corollary is trivially true.12
Finally, formal conditions are given under which an observation structure reduces the
set of BFE strategy proles for impatient players. Given G; OS and ; assume that
f 2 BFE(G) and let f _atg1t=1  fat( f)g1t=1: Say that the delay in observations has an
impact with respect to ~f; as dened in Theorem 1, if ~f does not support f _atg1t=1 as a BFE
of GOS;:13 Suppose that player i gains
i 
+d 1P
t=
t  [maxai2Ai hi(ai; _a
t
 i)  hi( _at)]
by a deviation of length d  1 from f _atg1t=1 that starts at  : Let
i (T ) 
1P
t=+d
t  1hi( _at)  (1  ) 1T!ii
for T  2d 2: It takes d 1 periods until all players know about is deviation, and 2d 2
periods after it, all of them know if i deviated again one period before his punishment
started. Then, Proposition 1 identies conditions under which the delay in observations
has an impact with respect to ~f .
Proposition 1. Let G; OS and  < 1 be given. Suppose there is f 2 BFE(G); i 2 I
and   1; such that for all positive integers T  2d  2; i > i (T ): Then, the delay in
observations has an impact with respect to ~f:
12It is taken into account that other behavior strategy proles than ~f may yield the Folk Theorem for
discount factors below ~; identied in Theorem 1.
13Note, however, that this does not rule out that there is some other behavior strategy prole f 6= ~f
such that f 2 BFE(GOS;) and fat(f)g1t=1 = f _atg1t=1:
13
Appendix B contains the proof of Proposition 1. Intuitively, player i deviates from
f _atg1t=1; if the punishment threat of behavior strategy prole ~f is discounted by too much,
and hence, is not strong enough to prevent is deviation. Whereas the initially prescribed
sequences of action proles under f and ~f are identical, punishment is immediate under
f but sets in after a lag of d periods under ~f: Thus, the behavior strategy prole dened
in Theorem 1 does not support the sequence of action proles f _atg1t=1 as a BFE of GOS;;
and the delay in observations has an impact with respect to ~f:
Another comparative static result is straightforward given the previous statements.
To simplify notation, given some observation structure OS; denote the maximal delay
among any pair of players by d(OS):
Corollary 3. Let G; OS and f 2 F with the same structure as ~f be given. Assume
that f 2 BFE(GOS;) for all  2 (^; 1): Then, for any other observation structure OS 0
represented by d(OS 0) and all  2 (^; 1); f 2 BFE(GOS0;) and H(f) > 0; if, and only
if, d(OS 0)  d(OS):
This result requires that punishment starts d periods after a unilateral deviation, that
is, it holds for a behavior strategy prole of the same structure as ~f:
6 Final Remarks
6.1 Less than full-dimensional payo¤ space and network
In Kinateder (2008), it is shown how this model extends to repeated games with any
dimension of the payo¤ space. The proof of the Folk Theorem and several other results
obtain, though the model is signicantly more complex. Therefore, it is presented in pure
actions. The setup identied there, however, can be extended to mixed actions using the
same idea as in FLT.
Kinateder (2008) also identies a possible application of the model. Suppose that all
players that play a repeated game are allocated to a connected network. The distance
between any pair of players along shortest paths gives the delay with which both of them
observe each other. Then, a Folk Theorem obtains though the network reduces the set of
BFE for a certain range of discount factors and under certain conditions.
One way to interpret the network is as a communication network. This is done in
Kinateder (2009) who studies the repeated Prisoners Dilemma in a network. Two players
that are linked communicate with each other. Strategic communication is studied and it is
shown that for a range of discount factors the set of BFE in this setup does intersect but
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not coincide with the one in a perfect monitoring repeated Prisoners Dilemma in which
truthful communication is imposed exogenously. New BFE with richer than truthful
communication arise while other strategy proles fail to remain BFE since some players
lie is protable.
6.2 Conclusion
In this paper, delayed perfect monitoring in an innitely repeated discounted game is
modelled. Each player receives a perfect signal of every other players action choice with
a xed and nite delay. Two players may observe each other with an asymmetric delay
and the delay among di¤erent pairs of players is heterogeneous. A Folk Theorem obtains
since patient players do not mind to receive the repeated games history gradually over
time. For impatient players the observation structure makes a di¤erence, as shown for
the Prisoners Dilemma. Due to the observation structure, the set of equilibrium payo¤
vectors is reduced for a range of discount factors and a behavior strategy prole is a BFE
over a smaller range of discount factors, both compared with a repeated game with perfect
and immediate monitoring.
There are several possibilities to extend the results obtained here, as for example in
Kinateder (2008 and 2009). Other extension are extremely involved and therefore left for
future research. To identify e¢ cient strategy proles requires to pick the most e¢ cient one
from an innite number of possible ones. To show the results presented here for a xed
payo¤ vector requires a similar exercise since frequently an innite number of sequences
of pure action proles yields the same payo¤ vector.
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Appendix A Proof of Theorem 1
Given G and OS; x x 2 F such that x is feasible (see footnote 8). Behavior strategy
prole ~f 2 F; which after being dened is shown to be a BFE of GOS; for any  2 (~; 1);
prescribes a di¤erent sequence of pure action proles fatg1t=1 to yield x for each ; although
its structure is unchanged. For any j 2 I; dene ~fj 2 Fj as follows:
~f 1j = a
1
j ; and for t > 1; given ob
t 1
j 2 Obt 1j ; in a slight abuse of notation, let ~f tj (obt 1j ) =
1) atj; unless there is 1  t0 < t such that for a^t0 2 obt 1j ; a^t0i 6= at0i ; while a^t0 i = at0 i:
In this case, switch to phase 2 at t0 + dj and let ~tj = a
t
j; for all t  1:
2) ~tj; if t
0 + dj  t < t0 + d; unless player l; where l 6= i deviates at any t00; where
t0 < t00 < t0 + d: Then, restart phase 2, set t0 = t00 and choose ~tj accordingly.
Otherwise, switch to phase 3 at t0 + d:
3) ij; if t
0 + d  t  t0 + T; where T is determined below. If any player l devi-
ates at any t; where t0 + T  t  t0 + d; restart phase 2, set t0 = t and choose
~tj accordingly. Otherwise, switch to phase 4 at t
0 + T + 1:
4) csj ; if t  t0 + T + s; where fcsg1s=1 is the sequence of action proles that yields
!i: If any player l deviates at any  > t0 + T; restart phase 2, set t0 =  and
choose ~tj accordingly.
Phase 2 corresponds to the ISP; phase 3 to the minmax punishment of the last
deviator, and phase 4 to the punishment reward phase. After any subsequent unilateral
deviation, the phase in which the game is at the time of the deviation prescribes the play
of the following d   1 periods in general, phase 2 is restarted. Then, the new deviator
is punished. If the same player deviates again in phase 2 (and no other does), however,
phase 2 is not restarted, but his punishment begins d periods after his rst deviation. He
is forced to his minmax payo¤ for at least d   1 periods. Then, all players know if he
deviated again in the period before punishment started, and hence, for how long it has to
last in order to eliminate his entire gain.
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By construction, the players can ignore multilateral deviations from ~f: Given any
observation prole, behavior strategy prole ~f prescribes a continuation play from which
no player can deviate protably for large enough : The result for phase 2 is shown
rst since it introduces arguments used thereafter to prove the results of phases 4, 1 and 3.
PHASE 2
Figure 2 illustrates the order of time periods in phase 2. Suppose player i deviates at t0:
During the ISP player j 6= i receives ISP t0j : By deviating at t00; where t0 < t00 < t0 + d;
he can maximally gain bj = max2[maxaj2Aj Hj(aj;  j)   Hj()]; since his remaining
ISP -payo¤ is unchanged. However, from period t00 + d on, he is forced to his minmax
payo¤ of 0, and then, his punishment reward phase is played. Player js deviation at t00
is not protable if for some positive integer T^2; where t00 + d  t0 + T^2;
(1  )bj + T^2!jj   (1  )
t0+T^2P
t=t00+d
t t
00 1Hj(i)  t0+T^2 t00!ij < 0;
(1  )bj   (1  )
t0+T^2P
t=t00+d
t t
00 1Hj(i) < 
t0+T^2 t00!ij   T^2!jj: (2)
Substituting t
0+T^2 t00 with T^2 makes the right-hand-side of (2) smaller (since t00 > t0;
t
0+T^2 t00 > T^2 holds for all  < 1:) Hence, (3) implies (2) and it su¢ ces to show (3).
(1  )bj   (1  )
t0+T^2P
t=t00+d
t t
00 1Hj(i) < 
T^2 [!ij   !jj] (3)
As  converges to 1, (3) is fullled: its left-hand-side converges to zero while its right-
hand-side is strictly positive since !ij > !
j
j: This may hold for several distinct pairs of
discount factor and strictly positive integer. (The last inequality is fullled trivially when
player js gain from punishing player i is larger than bj:) The case t00 + d > t0 + T^2 is
simpler since the sum on the left-hand-side of (3) and js payo¤ in the rst period(s) of
is punishment reward phase both drop out, which for  close to 1 is negligible.
For j = i after player is deviation at any t00; where t0 < t00 < t0 + d; the ISP about
is rst deviation continues. Once all players know about is deviation, i is played for at
least d  1 periods, that is, at least until period t0 + 2d  2; and at most until his entire
gain from all his deviations is eliminated. Thereafter, player is punishment reward phase
is played. Finally, select a large enough, strictly positive integer T2 such that no player
can deviate protably in phase 2.
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tt’
player i deviates
t’’
player j deviates
t’ + d
player i?s punish-
ment starts
t’’ + d
player j?s punish-
ment starts
t’ + T2 + 1
^
player i?s punish-
ment reward starts
t’’ + T2 + 1
^
player j?s punish-
ment reward starts
Figure 2: Order of time periods in phase 2
PHASE 4 and PHASE 1
The result for phase 4 is stated rst since it implies the result for phase 1. Suppose that
player j 6= i; and that i is the last deviator. Player j does not deviate at  ; the rst period
of is punishment reward phase, if for some positive integer T^4;
(1  )maxaj2Aj hj(aj; c1 j) + (1  )ISP j + T^4!jj   !ij < 0;
(1  )maxaj2Aj hj(aj; c1 j) + (1  )ISP j < !ij   T^4!jj:
When  converges to 1, the left-hand-side of the last inequality converges to zero
whereas the right-hand-side is strictly positive (since !ij > !
j
j; and for any  < 1; 
T^4 < 1):
The same argument holds when player j deviates in any other than the rst period of
player is punishment reward phase since for  close to 1, the payo¤ obtained at the
beginning of any punishment reward phase is negligible.
If j = i; player i cannot deviate protably in the rst period of his own punishment
reward phase, if there is a positive integer _T4 such that
(1  )bi + (1  )ISP i +  _T4!ii   !ii < 0;
where   t0 + _T4 + 1: This simplies to
(1  )bi + (1  )ISP i < !ii    _T4!ii ;
bi + ISP

i <
(1  _T4 )
(1 ) !
i
i : (4)
When  converges to 1, the left-hand-side of (4) is bounded above by a positive number
and the right-hand-side, by lHospital, converges to _T4!ii > 0: The same argument holds
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when player i deviates in any other than the rst period of his own punishment reward
phase since for  close to 1, the payo¤obtained at the beginning of any punishment reward
phase is negligible. For _T4 large enough, (4) holds. Hence, no players unilateral deviation
of nite length is protable in phase 4. Finally, let T4 be the smallest positive integer
such that no player can deviate protably in phase 4.
The result of phase 4 extends to phase 1 since by assumption any players target
payo¤ is strictly larger than his punishment reward payo¤. Hence, neither any players
nite deviation nor subsequent ones by any player are protable in phase 1. Again a
discount factor  < 1 and a positive integer T1 exist such that no player can deviate
protably from behavior strategy prole ~f in phase 1.
PHASE 3
Suppose player i is forced to his minmax payo¤ because he deviated at t0: By denition,
player i cannot deviate protably in this phase. Neither can any player j 6= i deviate
protably within the support of the mixed minmax action. Player j does not deviate by
choosing any action outside of the support of the mixed minmax action at any t; where
t0 + d  t  t0 + T3; if
(1  )bj + (1  )ISP tj + T3!jj   (1  )
T3P
t=t
t tHj(i)  t0+T3 t!ij < 0;
(1  )bj + (1  )ISP tj   (1  )
T3P
t=t
t tHj(i) < 
t0+T3 t!ij   T3!jj: (5)
Proceeding as in phase 2, that is, substituting on (5)s right-hand-side t
0+T3 t with
T3 (for any  < 1; T3 (t t
0) > T3 since t > t0) and taking the limit of  converging to
1, fullls (5) for at least one pair of discount factor  < 1 and strictly positive integer
T3: An analogous argument holds for deviations, or a sequence of deviations by di¤erent
players. Choose T3 large enough to prevent any such deviation.
Let T = maxfT1; T2; T3; T4g; and let ~ be the lowest discount factor, for which,
given T; no player can deviate protably in any phase. (If there are several pairs of T
and  for which the proof holds, the pair with the lowest discount factor is selected.)
Then, for any  2 (~; 1); ~f is a BFE strategy prole of GOS; and H( ~f) = x:
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Appendix B Proof of Proposition 1
LetG; OS and  < 1 be given. Select f 2 BFE(G) that generates the sequence of action
proles fat( f)g1t=1  f _atg1t=1: Take a behavior strategy prole with the same structure as
~f; dened in Theorem 1, to support this sequence of action proles as a BFE of GOS;:
Then, the delay in observations has an impact with respect to ~f if some player can deviate
protably. Suppose that for some player i 2 I; some   1; and all positive integers
T  2d  2;
(1  )
+d 1P
t=
t  maxai2Ai hi(ai; _a
t
 i) + 
T!ii > (1  )
1P
t=
t hi( _at);
+d 1P
t=
t  [maxai2Ai hi(ai; _a
t
 i)  hi( _at)] + (1  ) 1T!ii >
1P
t=+d
t  1hi( _at):
Subtracting (1   ) 1T!ii from both sides yields i > i (T ) and the delay in obser-
vations has an impact with respect to ~f:
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